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> The Question of expertise is introduced. |
Soc.Yes, pray do, Theaetetus, if only that I may get a good sight of my own likeness; for Theodore tells me I have a face like yours. Now suppose each of us had a lute, and he said they were both tuned to the same pitch; should we at once believe him, or should we have considered whether the man= who says skilled in music?
Theaet.
We should have considered.
Soc. And if we found that he was, we should believe him; or, if ignorant of
,
we should put no faith in him.
Theaet.
True.
'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Geneva","sans-serif";mso-bidi-font="-family:"Geneva'> 'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Geneva","sans-serif";mso-bidi-font="-family:"Geneva'>Soc. So now, I suppose, if we care at all about our faces being alike, we must
consider
whether the person who says so is conversant with lines, or not. Theaet. I think = he is that. (p. 6) |
|
Hidden assumption: = there are objective objects of knowledge.
In wisdom, (i. e., the objects of lea= rning) one can be wise. Objects of learning make learning possible.
Lets interpret science here as expertise.
Possessors of expert knowledge are wise, re: the subject for which they possess knowledge, if that expert is truly knowledgeable.
As if Science= =3D wisdom. |
Soc.
. . . And now tell me; is not learning the becoming wiser in what
one
learns?
Theaet.
Of course.
Soc.
And it is in wisdom that the wise are wise.
Theaet.
Yes.
Soc.
Now, is there any difference between this and science?
Theaet.
Of what do you speak?
Soc.
Wisdom. If we have accurate knowledge on any subjects, are we not
also
wise in them?
Theaet.
Of course.
Soc. Then science and wisdom are the same. (= p 7) |
|
How are we to understand the precise meaning knowledge? |
Soc.
This then is precisely the point that I am perplexed about, = and
unable to realize as I should wis h
in my own= mind, what accurate knowledge is. (p 8) |
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1st definition: Define knowledge as a list of the objects of knowledge that are addressed in various areas of expertise. |
Theaet.
Well, then, I think that what one can learn from Theodore may be
called
sciences, geometry and those you just named; and again,
shoe-making
and
the trades of the other craftsmen, all and each of them, are
nothing else than knowledge. (p 8) |
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Objection: A list of particulars cannot be adequate provide a general definition. |
Soc.
But, my Theaetetus, the question asked was not this, of what
things
Knowledge
is the science, nor how many sciences there are. For it= was not
with
any wish to count them that we asked, but to get a clear
knowledge about science, what it is in the abstract. Or is th=
ere nothing at all in what I
say?
(p 9) |
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Socrates provides a paradigm example of the form of answer he requires. Anticipating Aris= totle insight we ask, “What are the necessary and sufficient condition for something to be what it is and not another thing?” |
Soc.
. . . For inst=
ance, in the question about clay, it was obvious, surely, and
simple to reply, = that earth mixed up with any fluid would be
clay. (p 10) |
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Theaetetus draws an analogy between the way one defines clay and = his experience of discovering rules of generalization in geometry. But, he is not confident that we = will be successful. |
Theaet.
But, Socrates, your question about knowled= ge I am not likely to
answer as readily as that about the geometrical extension and the
power of number, though it seems to me that you require some
such= a reply. I
|
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Socrates compares himself to a midwife. He denies that he puts fo= rth any view at all, but only brings out the philosophical ideas of others. An important political expedient. |
Soc.
Consider now the whole case of these mid wives, and you will more
easily perceive my meaning. You are aware, of course, that none
of t= hem while she is herself having a family, acts as midwife
to others, but only those= who are now too old to have offspring.
(p 12) |
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Socrates continues to compare himself to a midwife/matchmaker/abortionist of ideas.
He considers the idea put forth by others and examines them and discarding falsehoods as a midwife discards an unviable fetus. |
For
I can't tell you that many have shown such a temper towards m= e
as to be quite ready to bite me when I propose to rid them of
some nonsensic= al idea. They fancy that I am not acting kindly
in doing this they are yet v= ery far from understanding that, as
no god bears any ill will to man, so I do nothing of this sort
from unkindness; it is because it is not permitted m= e to
concede falsehood or to put out of sight the truth. (p 15) |
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2nd definition
Theaetetus introduces the Protagorean theory of appearing. KNOWLEDGE =3D PERCEPTION |
Knowledge
is nothing else than perception. (p 15) |
|
Socrates restates the proposal. |
Soc.
Indeed, you seem to have delivered an opinion about knowledge
that is by no means commonplace: for it is one that Protagoras
also gave, though it was in a somewhat different way that he
expressed the same mean= ing. If I mistake not, he says that Man
is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they a=
re so, and of non-existing things that they are not. You
have read it, I think? (p 15) |
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An Objection
On this theory knowledge appears relative to an observer.
But, if the objects of knowledge, e.g. wind are considered proper= ties of the world, then a single object may have inconsistent properties, a logically intolerable result on Socrates’ view.
The result is that we cannot distinguish veridical from non-verid= ical perception.
If we accept the Protagorean theory we seem to have no way of accounting for falsehoods about an objective world. |
Soc.
Does he not then say, in effect, that as things appear sever=
ally to me,
such
they are to me, and as they seem to you, to you they are: and
both of
us,
I suppose, are human beings.
.
. . Does it=
not happen
sometimes,
when the wind blows, that one of us feels cold, another does
not?
And one feels it but slightly, another very much?
Theaet.
Certainly.
Soc.
Must we then on that particular occasion say that the wind is
cold of
itself,
or not cold? Or must we accept the view of Protagoras, that to
the
man
who shivers it is cold, but him who does no= t, it is not cold?
Theaet.
That is probable.
Soc.
Then it also seems so to each of them?
Theaet.
Yes.
Soc.
And this word "seems" is perceives.
Theaet.
It is so.
Soc.
Then fancy and perception are the same,
= at
least in feelings of he= at and all sensations of that kind. For
just as each person feels them, such, as= it seems, they are to
each.
Theaet.
Likely enough.
Soc.
Then perception must always be of something that exists; and= it
cannot be mistaken, since it is exact science.
Theaet.
It seems so. (pp 15 – 16) |
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The SECRET DOCTRINE :
Here is an ontological t= heory about the nature of the world that incorporates a theory of language and provides the background assumptions against which to analyze the epistemological theory to the e= ffect that knowledge is nothing else but perception. |
a
truly wise man when he gave us, who are but the rabble multitud=
e, a mere
hint
of this beautiful doctrine, but told his di= sciples the whole
truth under the seal of secrecy?
Theaet.
In what sense do you say this, Socrates?
Soc.
I will tell you a doctrine of no commonplace kind. Nothing
exists singly
and
by itself, and you cannot rightly call anything of itself by any
name;
but if y= ou speak of it as great, it will seem under other
conditions to be small; if= heavy, also light; and so with
everything else, on the ground of there being no single existence
either as a thing or as a quality. The things we now speak
of as existing, using thereby an incorrect expression, are
really produced from change of position and motion and un= ion
of one with another; for nothing ever is; it is ever being
produced. = On this point all philosophers ranged together,
Parmenides excepted, agree; Protagoras following
Heraclitus,
and Empedocles; as well as the great composers of each kind of
poetry, Epicharmus of comedy, Homer
of tragedy. For Homer, in saying:
"Ocean,
from whom the gods were created, and Tethys their mother,"
has in effect declared that all
things are produced from flux and movement.
Does
he not seem to you to mean this? (pp 16 – 17) |
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An attempt at physiological description
Seeing is defined as an epiphenomenon unique to each perceiver and relative to time, place and condition of change in observer and observed.= |
Soc.
Let us follow our late argument, and assume that nothing exi= sts
as a one by itself. Thus black and white and any other colour you please will be found to be
produced by the eye being directed to the object with the kind of
motion that suits that organ and thus what we cal= l colour of any kind will not be the object
that stri= kes nor the eye that is struck, but an intermediate
effect brought into exist= ence for the particular person at the
time. Or would you insist that what seems any colour to you,=
is also the same to a dog or to any creature? (p 18) |
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The secret doctrine continued.
A physics of sight.
Note, to keep things from coming to rest, “seeing-eye“ is introduced as a new linguistic convention.
All qualities of sensation follow the same pattern of pair wise interaction producing epiphenomena.
Recommends linguistic conventions that prohibit singular nouns an= d indexicals.
|
Soc.
Then attend, and we will see if we can arrive at a conclusio= n.
The import of the argument is this: that all things with which we
are conversant have motion, but in that motion there is sometimes
speed and sometimes slowness. Now the slow kind of movement takes
place without cha= nge of position, and produces its results in
this way; [that which has speed,] has a real motion towards the
sentient faculties which will admit of a un= ion, and
the
results so produced are quicker; for they h= ave motion in space,
and their movement is naturally one of change in positio= n.
Thus, when the eye, and any other object suited to the nature of
that org= an, unite and produce whiteness, and a perception of
whiteness coincident and= con genial with it, which never could
have resulted, had each of them gone to= any other, then, at the
moment when the sight from the eyes, and the whiteness from the
object
which, in contact with the eyes, produces the colour, meet in mid course, the eye
becomes filled = with sight, and then begins to see, and the
result is, not sight but a seeing = eye; while the object which,
together with the eye, gave birth to the appearan= ce of the colour, is invested with whiteness, and
t= hus here, too, the effect produced is, not whiteness, but a
white stick or st= one or whatever object it may be, the surface
of which happens to be coloured
with such a colour
that
all effects are produced by a relation and intercourse between
patient and agent, and varied in their results accord= ing to the
kind of movement. For to conceive of both an agent and also a
pati= ent in any one thing singly, so as to deny motion, is, they
tell us, an impossibility. There can
be no agent, till it has= come into contact with a patient nor a patient, unl= ess it has
an agent. And that which, by being in contact with one thing, is
an agent, becomes in turn a patient combined with some other
thing. So that = from all these considerations we must conceive,
as I said at first, that no one quality can exist singly and by
itself; it only becomes so-and-so to the particular person who
perceives it; and absolute existence must be taken = away from
everything, even though we, partly from familiarity and partly
from = want of skill, have been compelled to use it for many
purposes in our late dis= cussion. We ought not, however, as the
philosophers tell us, to concede the existe= nce of anything
belonging to me or to anybody else; nor "this" nor
"that", nor any other term that tends to fix a thing as
constan= t. We should speak of them according to the true nature
of the phenomena, as "brought into being," or
"created," or "perishing," or "being
altered." For if one adopts any term that
fixes
existence, he is easily proved to be in the wrong; we ought= to
use the above expressions both of things severally and of an
aggregate of many, such generalizations as they convey by the
terms "man," or "stone," or any particular
creature or kind of things. Well, Th= eaetetus, do these
doctrines seem nice? Would you like a further taste of them, as =
of food that you relish? (p 21–22) |
|
The Protagorean theory’s identification of knowledge with p= erception even augmented with and ontological theory seems to leave out an account = of non-veridical perceptions. |
Soc.
Then don't let us leave off while any part of the argument i= s
incomplete. We have yet to discuss the subject of dreams, and of
madness among other diseases, and such fancies as result
from wrong hearing,= or wrong seeing, or any other false
perception. For you are aware, of course, that= in all such cases
as these the argument we maintained is allowed to be proved
false, since in these states and conditions there assuredly are
such thin= gs as false perceptions; and so far from each man's
fancies being true for himself, absolutely nothing of what seems,
really is so to him.(p 23) |
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The
theory summarized. |
Soc.
Then you put it very well when you said that Know ledge is n=
othing else than Perception. So it comes to the same thing
whether, according to= Homer and Heraclitus and all that school,
all things are ever in motion, like c= urrents; or, according to
Protagoras, that wisest of men, man is the measure of all things;
or, according to Theaetetus, these facts being assumed, that
Perception comes to be Knowledge. Is it not so, Theaetetus? Must
we say t= his doctrine is a newly-born brat of yours, and that I
have been concerned on= ly in the delivery of it? Or how say
you?(p28) |
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Objection
The
theory seems self-contradictory because it gives no account of
expertise.
If each individual&=
#8217;s measure is knowledge, then even a baboon’s measure
counts as well.<= o:p>
|
Soc.
. . . . The measure of all things is a Pig or a baboon, or s= ome
other still more outlandish specimen of such creatures as are
endowed with the faculty for feeling.(p 28-29) |
|
Reply
Noting
a difficulty with the Protagorean theory is far from produ= cing
a counter argument.
The
model of proof proposed was that of mathematical rigor not pr=
obability.
|
Soc.
Ah! you are young, my friend, and
therefore your ears and your mind are readily open to the lecture
you have heard. (But don't be alarmed); for in reply to this,
Protagoras, or someo= ne in his behalf, will say, My fine
fellows, men and boys, here you are sitt= ing together and
talking fine, and bringing forward the gods, though I expres= sly
exempt them both in speaking and in my writings, and decline to
say wheth= er there are or are not such beings. You only say what
the mass of mankind w= ould accept if they heard it, that it is
strange if human beings, each and severally, shall have no
superiority in respect of wisdom over any animal; but as for
proof or cogent argument, you adduce none whatever; you adopt a
view that is a mere probability, albeit, if Theodore or any other
geomete= r chose to employ it, he would be worth simply nothing.
Consider therefore, both = you and Theodore, if you are prepared
to accept statements made on such weigh= ty matters by mere
probabilities and plausible talk. (p 30) |
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Objection
Examples
from language learning suggest that knowledge encompasses more
than just perception.
Note:
this does not by itself refute a weaker Protagorean theory = of
appearing to the effect that some knowledge is
perception= , but, it does pose a counter example to the Identity
of Knowledge and Perception. |
Soc.
. . . .if we have not learned the
dialect of foreigners, are we to say that we don't hear them,
when they speak, or that we don't hear them with understanding?
So again, if we don= 't know letters, when we look at them are we
to say that we don't see them, = or to insist that, of course, if
we see them, we understand them?
Theaet.
Only just this part of them, Socrates, tha= t we actually see and
hear,
we
shall say we understand; that is to say, that we both see and =
know the shape and colour of the
letters, and hear= and apprehend the shrill or the deep tones of
the voices; but such explanations of the meaning of both as
writing-masters or interpreters give, we shall allow t= hat we do
not know, as we do not realize them by seeing or hearing. (p
30-31)= |
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Objection
If
remembered and recalled perceptions count as something known, =
then we have another counter example to the identity of knowledge
and percepti= on since memories do not seem to co-occur with
perception. |
Soc.
Well, now, if a man saw an object, I suppose he remembers it=
sometimes?
Soc.
When he shuts his eyes? Or does he forget it when he does th= at?
Soc.
But this doesn't see it means doesn't know it , if, as we say, he sees means he knows .
Soc.
It follows then, that, if a man became acquainted with something,
though he still remembers it, he does not know it, since he do=
es not actually see it! |
|
Reply
The
previous worries about memory are solved by skepticism about
personal identity.
Note:
this is view is to be attributed to an interpretation of
Protagoras.
The
problem of expertise is answered by pointing to persuasion as= an
agent of change.
|
Soc:
. . . do you imagine anyone will concede to you that, if the=
memory abides in anyone of something that he underwent, it is a
feeling of the s= ame kind as it was when he underwent it, viz.
now that he no longer feels it?= Or again, do you suppose he will
hesitate to admit that thus it is possible = for the same man to
know and not to know the same thing? Or, should he fear s= uch an
admission as that, do you suppose he will allow you to maintain
that a person who is undergoing some change is identical with
what he was before= he began to undergo it? In other words,
that
a man is the particular person always, and = not several, and
that by a process of becoming this or that in endless variet= y,
if a becoming unlike should take place in him? for
as
wisdom or a wise man. On the contrary, I ev= en affirm that this
very man is wise, who, by producing a change in another,= to whom
certain things seem and are bad, makes them seem and be good. (p
35) |
|
The
question of knowledge is restated in terms of the role of tru=
th. |
Soc.
They think, then, that wisdom means a true view, and ignoran= ce
means
a
false opinion(p 30) |
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