|
The Question of expertise is introduced. |
Soc.Yes, pray do, Theaetetus, if only that I may ge=
t a
good sight of my own likeness; for Theodore tells me I have a face like
yours. Now suppose each of us had a lute, and he said they were both tuned to the same pitch;
should we at once believe him, or should we have considered whether the man=
who
says so skilled in music? Theaet. We should have considered. Soc. And if we found that he was, we should believe him; or, if
ignorant of music, we should put no faith in him. Theaet. True. Soc. So now, I suppose, if we care at all about our faces being
alike, we must consider whether the person who says so is conversant
with lines, or not. Theaet. I think = he is that. (p. 6) |
|
Hidden assumption: = there are objective objects of knowledge. In wisdom, (i. e., the objects of lea= rning) one can be wise. Objects of learning make learning possible. Lets interpret science here as expertise. Possessors of expert knowledge are wise, re: the subject for which they possess knowledge, if that expert is truly knowledgeable. As if Science= =3D wisdom. |
Soc. . . . And now tell me; is not learning the becoming wiser in
what one learns? Theaet. Of course. Soc. And it is in wisdom that the wise are wise. Theaet. Yes. Soc. Now, is there any difference between this and science? Theaet. Of what do you speak? Soc. Wisdom. If we have accurate knowledge on any subjects, are we
not also wise in them? Theaet. Of course. Soc. Then science and wisdom are the same. (= p 7) |
|
How are we to understand the precise meaning knowledge? |
Soc. This then is precisely the point that I am perplexed about, =
and
unable to realize as I should wis h in my own=
mind,
what accurate knowledge is. (p 8) |
|
1st definition: Define knowledge as a list of the objects of knowledge that are addressed in various areas of expertise. |
Theaet. Well, then, I think that what one can learn
from Theodore may be called sciences, geometry and those you just named; and again,
shoe-making and the trades of the other craftsmen, all and each of them, are
nothing else than knowledge. (p 8) |
|
Objection: A list of particulars cannot be adequate provide a general definition. |
Soc. But, my Theaetetus, the question asked was not this, of what
things Knowledge is the science, nor how many sciences there are. For it=
was
not with any wish to count them that we asked, but to
get a clear knowledge about science, what it is in the abstract. Or is th=
ere
nothing at all in what I say? (p 9) |
|
Socrates provides a paradigm example of the form of answer he requires. Anticipating Aris= totle insight we ask, “What are the necessary and sufficient condition for something to be what it is and not another thing?” |
Soc. . . . For inst=
ance,
in the question about clay, it was obvious, surely, and simple to reply, =
that
earth mixed up with any fluid would be clay. (p 10) |
|
Theaetetus draws an analogy between the way one defines clay and = his experience of discovering rules of generalization in geometry. But, he is not confident that we = will be successful. |
Theaet. But, Socrates, your question about knowled=
ge I
am not likely to answer as readily as that about the geometrical extension
and the power of number, though it seems to me that you require some such=
a
reply. I (p 11) |
|
Socrates compares himself to a midwife. He denies that he puts fo= rth any view at all, but only brings out the philosophical ideas of others. An important political expedient. |
Soc. Consider now the whole case of these mid wives, and you will
more easily perceive my meaning. You are aware, of course, that none of t=
hem while
she is herself having a family, acts as midwife to others, but only those=
who
are now too old to have offspring. (p 12) |
|
Socrates continues to compare himself to a midwife/matchmaker/abortionist of ideas. He considers the idea put forth by others and examines them and discarding falsehoods as a midwife discards an unviable fetus. |
For I can't tell you that many have shown such a temper towards m=
e as
to be quite ready to bite me when I propose to rid them of some nonsensic=
al
idea. They fancy that I am not acting kindly in doing this they are yet v=
ery
far from understanding that, as no god bears any ill will to man, so I do
nothing of this sort from unkindness; it is because it is not permitted m=
e to
concede falsehood or to put out of sight the truth. (p 15) |
|
2nd definition Theaetetus introduces the Protagorean theory of appearing. KNOWLEDGE =3D PERCEPTION |
Knowledge is nothing else than perception. (p 15) |
|
Socrates restates the proposal. |
Soc. Indeed, you seem to have delivered an opinion about knowledge
that is by no means commonplace: for it is one that Protagoras also gave,
though it was in a somewhat different way that he expressed the same mean=
ing.
If I mistake not, he says that Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they a=
re
so, and of non-existing things that they are not. You have read it, I think? (p 15) |
|
An Objection On this theory knowledge appears relative to an observer. But, if the objects of knowledge, e.g. wind are considered proper= ties of the world, then a single object may have inconsistent properties, a logically intolerable result on Socrates’ view. The result is that we cannot distinguish veridical from non-verid= ical perception. If we accept the Protagorean theory we seem to have no way of accounting for falsehoods about an objective world. |
Soc. Does he not then say, in effect, that as things appear sever=
ally
to me, such they are to me, and as they seem to you, to you they are: and
both of us, I suppose, are human beings. . . . Does it=
not
happen sometimes, when the wind blows, that one of us feels cold, another
does not? And one feels it but slightly, another very
much? Theaet. Certainly. Soc. Must we then on that particular occasion say that the wind is
cold of itself, or not cold? Or must we accept the view of
Protagoras, that to the man who shivers it is cold, but him who does no=
t,
it is not cold? Theaet. That is probable. Soc. Then it also seems so to each of them? Theaet. Yes. Soc. And this word "seems" is perceives. Theaet. It is so. Soc. Then fancy and perception are the same, =
at least in feelings of he=
at and
all sensations of that kind. For just as each person feels them, such, as=
it
seems, they are to each. Theaet. Likely enough. Soc. Then perception must always be of something that exists; and=
it cannot
be mistaken, since it is exact science. Theaet. It seems so. (pp 15 – 16) |
|
The SECRET DOCTRINE : Here is an ontological t= heory about the nature of the world that incorporates a theory of language and provides the background assumptions against which to analyze the epistemological theory to the e= ffect that knowledge is nothing else but perception. |
a truly wise man when he gave us, who are but the rabble multitud=
e, a
mere hint of this beautiful doctrine, but told his di=
sciples
the whole truth under the seal of secrecy? Theaet. In what sense do you say this, Socrates? Soc. I will tell you a doctrine of no commonplace kind. Nothing exists singly and by itself, and you cannot rightly call
anything of itself by any name; but if y=
ou
speak of it as great, it will seem under other conditions to be small; if=
heavy,
also light; and so with everything else, on the ground of there being no
single existence either as a thing or as a quality. The things we now speak of as existing, using thereby an incorrect
expression, are really produced from change of position and motion and un=
ion
of one with another; for nothing ever is; it is ever being produced. =
On
this point all philosophers ranged together, Parmenides excepted, agree;
Protagoras following Heraclitus, and Empedocles; as well as the great composers of each
kind of poetry, Epicharmus of comedy, Homer of
tragedy. For Homer, in saying: "Ocean, from whom the gods were created, and Tethys their
mother," has in effect declared that all things are produced from flux and movement. Does he not seem to you to mean this? (pp 16 – 17) |
|
An attempt at physiological description Seeing is defined as an epiphenomenon unique to each perceiver and relative to time, place and condition of change in observer and observed.= |
Soc. Let us follow our late argument, and assume that nothing exi=
sts
as a one by itself. Thus black and white and any other colour
you please will be found to be produced by the eye being directed to the
object with the kind of motion that suits that organ and thus what we cal=
l colour of any kind will not be the object that stri=
kes
nor the eye that is struck, but an intermediate effect brought into exist=
ence
for the particular person at the time. Or would you insist that what seems
any colour to you,=
is also
the same to a dog or to any creature? (p 18) |
|
The secret doctrine continued. A physics of sight. Note, to keep things from coming to rest, “seeing-eye“ is introduced as a new linguistic convention. All qualities of sensation follow the same pattern of pair wise interaction producing epiphenomena. Recommends linguistic conventions that prohibit singular nouns an= d indexicals. |
Soc. Then attend, and we will see if we can arrive at a conclusio=
n.
The import of the argument is this: that all things with which we are
conversant have motion, but in that motion there is sometimes speed and
sometimes slowness. Now the slow kind of movement takes place without cha=
nge
of position, and produces its results in this way; [that which has speed,]
has a real motion towards the sentient faculties which will admit of a un=
ion,
and the results so produced are quicker; for they h=
ave
motion in space, and their movement is naturally one of change in positio=
n.
Thus, when the eye, and any other object suited to the nature of that org=
an,
unite and produce whiteness, and a perception of whiteness coincident and=
con
genial with it, which never could have resulted, had each of them gone to=
any
other, then, at the moment when the sight from the eyes, and the whiteness
from the object which, in contact with the eyes, produces the colour, meet in mid course, the eye becomes filled =
with
sight, and then begins to see, and the result is, not sight but a seeing =
eye;
while the object which, together with the eye, gave birth to the appearan=
ce of
the colour, is invested with whiteness, and t=
hus
here, too, the effect produced is, not whiteness, but a white stick or st=
one
or whatever object it may be, the surface of which happens to be coloured with such a colour.
And so it is with all other qualities, we must take the same view of hard=
and
hot and everything else, viz. that, as we before said, nothing has an
absolute existence by itself, but that all effects are produced by a relation and
intercourse between patient and agent, and varied in their results accord=
ing
to the kind of movement. For to conceive of both an agent and also a pati=
ent
in any one thing singly, so as to deny motion, is, they tell us, an impossibility. There can be no agent, till it has=
come
into contact with a patient nor a patient, unl=
ess it
has an agent. And that which, by being in contact with one thing, is an
agent, becomes in turn a patient combined with some other thing. So that =
from
all these considerations we must conceive, as I said at first, that no one
quality can exist singly and by itself; it only becomes so-and-so to the
particular person who perceives it; and absolute existence must be taken =
away
from everything, even though we, partly from familiarity and partly from =
want
of skill, have been compelled to use it for many purposes in our late dis=
cussion.
We ought not, however, as the philosophers tell us, to concede the existe=
nce of
anything belonging to me or to anybody else; nor "this" nor
"that", nor any other term that tends to fix a thing as constan=
t.
We should speak of them according to the true nature of the phenomena, as
"brought into being," or "created," or
"perishing," or "being altered." For if one adopts any
term that fixes existence, he is easily proved to be in the wrong; we ought=
to
use the above expressions both of things severally and of an aggregate of
many, such generalizations as they convey by the terms "man," or
"stone," or any particular creature or kind of things. Well, Th=
eaetetus,
do these doctrines seem nice? Would you like a further taste of them, as =
of
food that you relish? (p 21–22) |
|
The Protagorean theory’s identification of knowledge with p= erception even augmented with and ontological theory seems to leave out an account = of non-veridical perceptions. |
Soc. Then don't let us leave off while any part of the argument i=
s incomplete.
We have yet to discuss the subject of dreams, and of madness among other
diseases, and such fancies as result from wrong hearing,=
or wrong
seeing, or any other false perception. For you are aware, of course, that=
in
all such cases as these the argument we maintained is allowed to be proved
false, since in these states and conditions there assuredly are such thin=
gs
as false perceptions; and so far from each man's fancies being true for
himself, absolutely nothing of what seems, really is so to him.(p 23) |
|
|
|
|
The theory summarized. |
Soc. Then you put it very well when you said that Know ledge is n=
othing
else than Perception. So it comes to the same thing whether, according to=
Homer
and Heraclitus and all that school, all things are ever in motion, like c=
urrents;
or, according to Protagoras, that wisest of men, man is the measure of all
things; or, according to Theaetetus, these facts being assumed, that
Perception comes to be Knowledge. Is it not so, Theaetetus? Must we say t=
his
doctrine is a newly-born brat of yours, and that I have been concerned on=
ly
in the delivery of it? Or how say you?(p28) |
|
Objection The theory seems self-contradictory because it gives no account of
expertise. If each individual&= #8217;s measure is knowledge, then even a baboon’s measure counts as well.<= o:p> |
Soc. . . . . The measure of all things is a Pig or a baboon, or s=
ome
other still more outlandish specimen of such creatures as are endowed with
the faculty for feeling.(p 28-29) |
|
Reply Noting a difficulty with the Protagorean theory is far from produ=
cing
a counter argument. The model of proof proposed was that of mathematical rigor not pr=
obability.
|
Soc. Ah! you are young, my friend, and
therefore your ears and your mind are readily open to the lecture you have
heard. (But don't be alarmed); for in reply to this, Protagoras, or someo=
ne
in his behalf, will say, My fine fellows, men and boys, here you are sitt=
ing
together and talking fine, and bringing forward the gods, though I expres=
sly
exempt them both in speaking and in my writings, and decline to say wheth=
er
there are or are not such beings. You only say what the mass of mankind w=
ould
accept if they heard it, that it is strange if human beings, each and
severally, shall have no superiority in respect of wisdom over any animal;
but as for proof or cogent argument, you adduce none whatever; you adopt a
view that is a mere probability, albeit, if Theodore or any other geomete=
r chose
to employ it, he would be worth simply nothing. Consider therefore, both =
you
and Theodore, if you are prepared to accept statements made on such weigh=
ty
matters by mere probabilities and plausible talk. (p 30) |
|
Objection Examples from language learning suggest that knowledge encompasses
more than just perception. Note: this does not by itself refute a weaker Protagorean theory =
of
appearing to the effect that some knowledge is perception=
, but,
it does pose a counter example to the Identity of Knowledge and
Perception. |
Soc. . . . .if we have not learned the
dialect of foreigners, are we to say that we don't hear them, when they
speak, or that we don't hear them with understanding? So again, if we don=
't
know letters, when we look at them are we to say that we don't see them, =
or
to insist that, of course, if we see them, we understand them? Theaet. Only just this part of them, Socrates, tha=
t we
actually see and hear, we shall say we understand; that is to say, that we both see and =
know
the shape and colour of the letters, and hear=
and apprehend
the shrill or the deep tones of the voices; but such explanations of the
meaning of both as writing-masters or interpreters give, we shall allow t=
hat
we do not know, as we do not realize them by seeing or hearing. (p 30-31)=
|
|
Objection If remembered and recalled perceptions count as something known, =
then
we have another counter example to the identity of knowledge and percepti=
on since
memories do not seem to co-occur with perception. |
Soc. Well, now, if a man saw an object, I suppose he remembers it=
sometimes? Soc. When he shuts his eyes? Or does he forget it when he does th=
at? Soc. But this doesn't see it means doesn't know it
, if, as we say, he sees means he knows . Soc. It follows then, that, if a man became acquainted with
something, though he still remembers it, he does not know it, since he do=
es not
actually see it! |
|
Reply The previous worries about memory are solved by skepticism about
personal identity. Note: this is view is to be attributed to an interpretation of
Protagoras. The problem of expertise is answered by pointing to persuasion as=
an
agent of change. |
Soc: . . . do you imagine anyone will concede to you that, if the=
memory
abides in anyone of something that he underwent, it is a feeling of the s=
ame
kind as it was when he underwent it, viz. now that he no longer feels it?=
Or
again, do you suppose he will hesitate to admit that thus it is possible =
for
the same man to know and not to know the same thing? Or, should he fear s=
uch
an admission as that, do you suppose he will allow you to maintain that a
person who is undergoing some change is identical with what he was before=
he
began to undergo it? In other words, that a man is the particular person always, and =
not
several, and that by a process of becoming this or that in endless variet=
y,
if a becoming unlike should take place in him? for I
suppose we must be careful not to catch up each other s words. No! my very fine fellow, he will say, do come to the pre=
cise
point of my assertion, and prove it wrong if you can. Show that our perce=
ptions
are not special and peculiar to each of us, or that, if they are such, no=
t at
all the more for that what seems to anyone becomes so to him, and to him =
only
(or say, is so to him, if we may use the verb to be ) to whom it seems. B=
ut
in talking of swine and baboons, you not only act swinishly yourself, but=
you
persuade your hearers to do the same towards my writings; which is not fa=
ir
play. For I insist that the truth is as I have stated in my book; that ea=
ch
of us is a measure of what is and what is not; though I allow that there =
is
an enormous difference between one man and another in this very respect, =
that
to one man this seems to be and therefore is, to another that. In this se=
nse
I am far from denying that there is such a thing as wisdom or a wise man. On the contrary, I ev=
en
affirm that this very man is wise, who, by producing a change in another,=
to whom
certain things seem and are bad, makes them seem and be good. (p 35) |
|
The question of knowledge is restated in terms of the role of tru=
th. |
Soc. They think, then, that wisdom means a true view, and ignoran=
ce
means a false opinion(p 30) |
|
|
|