" ;*==== dynamic connectionist representation ====* " 0 0 " ; *=== Color shift ===* " 0 0 " ; We now begin to shift the focus from middle sized " 0 0 " ; objects (& methods for interacting with objects)to colors. " 0 0 "; *=====================================================* " 0 0 " ; An alternative accounting of explaination " 0 0 " ; rock paper scissors functional categories " 0 0 " ; *=== ===* " 0 0 " ; previous versions of this model surmise that it is the " 0 0 " ; external world in need of explaination. This verion " 0 0 " ; adds that it is also the organization of the LNG & " 0 0 " ; the organization of other sensory aparatus that is " 0 0 " ; in need of and lends to expaination. " 0 0 " ; *=== ===* " 0 0 " ; On this model there are sensory data reaching the eye but " 0 0 " ; the middle sized objects of experience are constituted at " 0 0 " ; a point beyond the 'buzzing bloom' of raw sensory input " 0 0 " ; === Harry Gets a sensory input system ==== " 0 0 " ; dthat categories " 0 0 " ; singular attention to identifying and naming rocks " 0 0 " ; tends to supress incoherent behaviors and " 0 0 " ; the associated concepts that incohere " 0 0 0 1 52 " ; we hypothesize that " 0 0 " ; actions of the body, e.g. production of cortisol, " 0 0 " ; adrenilin, etc. associated with affect, influence " 0 0 " ; the activation of neurons " 0 0 5 0 "AFFECTIVE influence" " ; we hypothesize that " 0 0 " ; if there is an independent world, that world will " 0 0 " ; influence the activation of neurons " 0 0 " ; if there is no independent world, a story needs to be " 0 0 " ; told about what source provides this degree of input " 0 0 " ; perhaps it is the influence of god or angels " 0 0 5 1 "WORLD influence" " ; the model is silent on the ontological status of perceptions " 0 0 " ; materialist may interpret in a topic neutral way " 0 0 " ; dualist and epiphenomenalist may see qualia here " 0 0 " ; in any case this collection of nodes is excited when instances of " 0 0 " ; their corresponding object types are present " 0 0 5 2 "r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 2" 1 1 2 5 3 "r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 3" 1 1 3 5 4 "r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 4" 1 1 4 5 5 "r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 5" 1 1 5 5 6 "r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 6" 1 1 6 5 7 "r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 7" 1 1 7 5 8 "p r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 8" 1 1 8 5 9 "p r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 9" 1 1 9 5 10 "p r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 10" 1 1 10 5 11 "p r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 11" 1 1 11 5 12 "p r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 12" 1 1 12 5 13 "p r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 13" 1 1 13 5 14 "s r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 14" 1 1 14 5 15 "s r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 15" 1 1 15 5 16 "s r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 16" 1 1 16 5 17 "s r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 17" 1 1 17 5 18 "s r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 18" 1 1 18 5 19 "s r-g-b electomagnetic radiation 19" 1 1 19 " ; The teachers instruction is empirical support and so is linked to special. " 0 0 " ; Rock is only incidental here in the sense that the teacher is directing " 0 0 " ; attention to a red patch in the visual field that is contingently associated " 0 0 " ; with each particular instance of rock. " 0 0 " ; 5 33 Teacher demands, 'Point to a RED Rock' 33 " 0 0 " ; 1 1 33 " 0 0 " ; Such demands call forth and cohere with the concept RED Rock. " 0 0 " ; The decision here is to appeal to a binary concept for the colored patch " 0 0 " ; This provides multiple semantic possibilities for parsing the expression. " 0 0 " ; Is the colored patch co-extensive with the face of the red rock? " 0 0 " ; 1 20 33 " 0 0 " ; linguistic, logical, and other conceptual representations are created " 0 0 " ; and activated in areas of the brain as a consequence of " 0 0 " ; repeated experiences. " 0 0 " ; note we can think of aquiring a concept as the action called naming. " 0 0 " ; That there is a pre-experience organized neural component for the " 0 0 " ; the representation of these concepts we may attribute to the " 0 0 " ; association of ideas instanciated via an evolved neural capacity. " 0 0 5 20 " concept/name:' RED rock' 20" 5 21 " concept/name:' White paper' 21" 5 22 " concept/name: 'Gray scissors' 22" " ; we will need to provide a number of neurons to represent network vectors " 0 0 " ; that encode pre-experience basic color concepts RED YELLOW BLUE and GREYSCALE. " 0 0 " ; In the idealized fiction of Mary, this is everything a completed and true " 0 0 " ; biophysical science of color can represent in the absence of color experience. " 0 0 " ; we want it to remain an open question whether such concepts, when acted on, are " 0 0 " ; identical to phenomenal colors. " 0 0 5 38 "RED concept 38" 5 39 "YELLOW concept 39" 5 40 "BLUE concept 40" 5 41 "GRAYSCALE concept 41" " ; In this limited world all items of possible experience may be evidence for the " 0 0 " ; color theory " 0 0 " ; WHERE DO WE PLACE NODE REPRESENTATION OF POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE AT THE LNG OR IN " 0 0 " ; THE LANGUAGE CENTER " 0 0 " ; the color theory coheres with the grey scale theory ????? " 0 0 1 41 40 1 41 39 1 41 38 " ; In this limited world two items of possible experience may be evidence for the " 0 0 " ; Grayscale theory, white paper and grey scissors " 0 0 1 21 41 7 41 21 1 22 41 7 41 22 " ; In this limited world a red rock is incoherent with geyscale theory " 0 0 2 41 20 " ; red rock is incoherent with the blue and yellow central prototypes too " 0 0 2 39 20 2 40 20 " ; red rock incoheres with a blue/yellow mixture of color as well " 0 0 2 44 20 " ; But the grey appearance of the sissors may be accounted for in color theory " 0 0 " ; on some combination of primary colors " 0 0 1 38 22 7 22 38 1 39 22 7 22 39 1 40 22 7 22 40 " ; We can include in this the heirarchy of proto-typal color combinations " 0 0 5 42 "Red-Blue concept 42" 1 38 42 1 40 42 2 39 42 5 43 "Red-Yellow concept 43" 1 38 43 1 39 43 2 40 43 5 44 "Yellow-Blue concept 44" 1 39 44 1 40 44 2 38 44 " ; will there be a significant difference in knowledge between object recognition " 0 0 " ; pre and post color experience that supports the abilities thesis " 0 0 " ; once we provide for ostensive naming then re-dubbing of these color experiences " 0 0 " ; acts and actions are named concepts as well. " 0 0 " ; It is well to keep passive conceptual contents seperate " 0 0 " ; from their origins in bodily activities and actions. " 0 0 " ; cooresponding node clusters will also be created further on as " 0 0 " ; method nodes responsible for the bodily activities associated " 0 0 " ; with the concepts. The activation level of a concept node may or " 0 0 " ; may not necessitate an action of the body. " 0 0 " ; *=== these concepts now represent scientific methods for ===* " 0 0 " ; evaluating the theories of color psychology " 0 0 5 23 " concept 'breaks' 23" 5 24 " concept 'wraps'24" 5 25 " concept 'cuts' 25" " ; dthat is the neurology of ostension " 0 0 " ; we use dthat to capture neuronal activations associated with " 0 0 " ; tagging observations without attributing any properties to the " 0 0 " ; observation except that the subject observation is self-identical " 0 0 " ; and not another thing " 0 0 5 26 "dthat 26" " ; nodes 20 and 27 are called upon and cohere with the baptism of Rock " 0 0 " ; ideally negative links should be created to reinforce the uniquenes " 0 0 1 26 27 " ; 1 26 20 THIS IS MARY'S NAMING DEFECT. SHE CANNOT INDEX RED UNTIL SHE HAS SENSORY INPUT OUTSIDE HER ROOM " 0 0 " ; let's baptize paper and scissors as well" 0 0 1 26 21 1 26 22 " ; dthat has two distinct roles, name-dthat and get-dthat. " 0 0 " ; because these roles are purpositive, dthat is valence linked. " 0 0 " ; name-that is intimately connected to observation nodes. " 0 0 5 27 "name-that 27" 3 27 .05 1 0 27 " ; get-that is intimately connected to methods nodes. " 0 0 " ; get-that, is accomplished via links between dthat, some " 0 0 " ; motor activating neurons such as move-towards, " 0 0 " ; and the relevant observated elements impinging on the organism " 0 0 5 28 "get-that 28" 3 28 .05 1 0 28 " ; methods of action " 0 0 " ; this is ambiguous between the organisms action and the " 0 0 " ; action of the suposed objects of the world " 0 0 5 29 "BREAK method 29" 5 30 "COVER method 30" 5 31 "CUT method 31" 5 53 "Tactile and Propreoception-neuro interface 53" 1 53 1 " ; the action-concepts and methods associated with the respective objects are invoked in " 0 0 " ; response to the data of experience but are not explained by the presence of the data " 0 0 " ; here Harry exhibits ostensive indexical behavior " 0 0 5 32 " 'thats a RED ROCK!' point/touch 32" 1 32 53 " ; the action-concepts and methods associated with the respective objects are invoked in " 0 0 " ; response to the data of experience but are not explained by the presence of the data " 0 0 " ; here Harry exhibits ostensive indexical behavior " 0 0 5 51 " 'thats Grey Scissors!' point/touch 51" 1 51 53 " ; the action-concepts and methods associated with the respective objects are invoked in " 0 0 " ; response to the data of experience but are not explained by the presence of the data " 0 0 " ; here Harry exhibits ostensive indexical behavior " 0 0 5 52 " 'thats White Paper!' point/touch 52" 1 52 53 " ; we will entertain theories of objects and powers. " 0 0 " ; CONTROVERSIALLY i'VE ENTERTAINED THE IDEA THAT IDENTIFYING A ROCK " 0 0 " ; INVOLVES A THEORETICAL COMMITMENT TO THE EXISTENCE OF ROCKS " 0 0 " ; ON THIS MODEL IT ARISES OUT OF THE BODIES DEMAND TO INTERACT WITH " 0 0 " ; THE WORLD THROUGH THE ACTIONS OF POINTING, TOUCHING, ETC " 0 0 " ; This may also have arisin alternatively in conjunction " 0 0 " ; with directed eye movement or other bodily action. " 0 0 " ; Nine theories are in competition.. ontic commitment, gray scale, " 0 0 " ; colortheory, and three object theories, three identity theories. " 0 0 8 0 9 5 34 "ONTIC COMMITMENT 34" 1 34 32 1 34 51 1 34 52 10 34 "T4 this exists" " ; Note that confidence in the hypothesis of an external world may " 0 0 " ; grow simply because there is no countervailing influence " 0 0 " ; but the hypothesis may sit idle unless it connects up with other " 0 0 " ; ideas " 0 0 " ; here we mark neuronal bundles that may together represent theories " 0 0 " ; that cohere together or compete. So, we mark concept nodes and " 0 0 " ; methods nodes of the respective theories appropriately. " 0 0 " ; Evidence nodes may contribute to the acceptance of one or more " 0 0 " ; theories and so are not marked as belonging to a particular theory " 0 0 10 20 "T1 Rock breaks" 10 23 "T1 Rock breaks" 10 29 "T1 Rock breaks" 10 21 "T2 Paper covers" 10 24 "T2 Paper covers" 10 30 "T2 Paper covers" 10 22 "T3 Scissors cuts" 10 25 "T3 Scissors cuts" 10 31 "T3 Scissors cuts" " ; classification of objects into types proceeds functionally " 0 0 " ; by competition between threories " 0 0 " ; place negative links between methods for BREAK, COVER, CUT " 0 0 2 29 30 2 29 31 2 31 30 " ; place negative links between object concepts Rock Paper Scissors " 0 0 2 20 21 2 21 22 2 22 20 " ; place negative links between functional concepts Breaks, Wraps, cuts " 0 0 2 23 24 2 24 25 2 25 23 " ; the relevant nodes are activated or supressed relative to function associated " 0 0 1 25 31 2 25 30 2 25 29 1 24 30 2 24 31 2 24 29 1 23 29 2 23 30 2 23 31 1 2 37 1 3 37 1 4 37 1 5 37 1 6 37 1 7 37 1 8 36 1 9 36 1 10 36 1 11 36 1 12 36 1 13 36 1 14 35 1 15 35 1 16 35 1 17 35 1 18 35 1 19 35 " ; here we represent the coherence and competition between the " 0 0 " ; various theories' methods " 0 0 1 20 29 2 20 30 2 20 31 1 21 30 2 21 29 2 21 31 1 22 31 2 22 29 2 22 30 " ; here we note the explanatory relations of evidential data relative to " 0 0 " ; Theories supported. One might opt to place explanatory relations between " 0 0 " ; concepts nodes and the LNG nodes since the later locates the sense/environment interface " 0 0 " ; and it is possible for there to be mismatch between the data arriving at " 0 0 " ; the sensory input system and the later partitioning of that data by the LNG. " 0 0 " ; ON THIS MODEL, IT IS NO LONGER FEATURES OF THE WORLD INVOLVED IN EXPLAINATION. " 0 0 " ; IT IS ONLY THE 'PRODUCT' OF FEATURES OF THE 'BRAIN' THAT ARE INVOLVED IN EXPLANATION. " 0 0 " ; 7 37 20 " 0 0 " ; consider removing 7 37 20 ? " 0 0 7 36 21 7 35 22 " ; instead the tactile and proprioceptive data for the three objects of the world do lend support " 0 0 " ; to beliefs about their underlying physical structure and may influence albeit indirectly color " 0 0 " ; theory and so we include explanitory links as follows " 0 0 7 51 53 7 52 53 7 32 53 " ; the action-concepts and methods associated with the respective objects are invoked in " 0 0 " ; response to the data of experience but are not explained by the presence of the data " 0 0 5 35 "LNG V1-V4 35" " ; connects this area of the visual cortex to a subspace in the area responsible " 0 0 " ; for the rock concept " 0 0 1 35 22 5 36 "LNG V1-V4 36" 1 36 21 5 37 "LNG V1-V4 37" " ; 1 37 20 is withheld since inside the room mary may manipulate but not see red objects " 0 0 " ; this is replaced by propreoceptive and tactile coherence at nodes 51 52 and 32 " 0 0 " ; ============ Two color theories ================== " 0 0 10 41 "T6 grayscale color theory" " ; === Mary knows that there is no competition between grayscale color theory and colors " 0 0 " ; yet an 'appearance' of gray cannot simultaneously be an 'appearance' of any other color " 0 0 " ; The scientific theory of colors, i.e. color concepts, do have an explatory " 0 0 " ; relationship relative to simple objects, i.e. colored shapes like rocks. " 0 0 7 20 38 1 20 38 10 38 "T5 color class/sort theory" 10 39 "T5 color class/sort theory" 10 40 "T5 color class/sort theory" 10 42 "T5 color class/sort theory" 10 43 "T5 color class/sort theory" 10 44 "T5 color class/sort theory" " ; And the mixed colors of the color wheel have a higher level explanatory relationship " 0 0 " ; relative to the primary colors. They explain only on the assumption of pure color " 0 0 7 42 38 7 42 39 7 42 40 7 43 40 7 43 38 7 43 39 7 44 38 7 44 39 7 44 40 " ; =========== not yet sure I've exhausted the explanatory relationships ============== " 0 0 " ; === still have to provide a complete index of post experience ostensive reference === " 0 0 " ; === CONCEPTS USED IN THE KAPLAN ARGUMENT CONCERNING MARY === " 0 0 " ; Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs that attribute phenomenal properties. Whereas, phenomenal " 0 0 " ; properties are properties characterizing what it is like to be in a mental state. " 0 0 " ; These ARU models will try to capture these as network nodes and interconnections. " 0 0 " ; The Chalmers concepts red_c, red_i, and E may all refer to the same quality, " 0 0 " ; phenomenal redness. all three fix reference to phenomenal redness relationally, " 0 0 " ; characterizing it in terms of its relations to external objects or acts of ostension, " 0 0 " ; and all designate this quality rigidly." 0 0 " ; if they may co-refer, then they cohere. So, positively connect them to phenomenal redness " 0 0 " ; red_C is (the concept required for the belief that there could be) a phenomenal quality " 0 0 " ; typically caused in normal subjects within my community by paradigmatic red things " 0 0 5 45 " comunity relational red_C 45" 1 45 33 " ; red_I is the phenomenal quality typically caused in me by paradigmatic red things " 0 0 5 46 " individual relational red_I 46" 1 46 33 " ; E is the rigidly indexed Demonstrative quality. picking out whatever quality is ostended " 0 0 " ; E is Kaplanesque: it has a 'content' corresponding to the quality actually ostened " 0 0 " ; and a character which fixes reference by picking out the quality ostended in that context " 0 0 5 47 " 'This indexed quality' DEMONSTRATIVE E 47" 1 47 33 " ; The crucial phenomenal concept that does not pick out phenomenal redness in terms of its " 0 0 " ; relation to external objects or to acts of ostension, but rather picks it out in terms " 0 0 " ; of its intrinsic phenominal nature. " 0 0 5 33 "SUCH AND SUCH CONCEPT R 33" " ; ====================== MARY MAY ENTERTAIN THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHESES =============== " 0 0 5 48 " red_C = R 48" 10 48 "T7 red_C = R" 5 49 " red_I = R 49" 10 49 "T8 red_I = R" 5 50 " E = R 50" 10 50 "T9 E = R"